Hovvever, it is comforting to note that in this country many leading publicists strongly support the participation; of the United States in the United Nations Human Rights Programs, effectively arguing that there are no constitutional barriers to such participa tion. Professor Cari J-Friedrich, for example, is of the opinion that «states' rights cannot be pleaded against human rights vvithin a fe deral system, except where the constitution explicitly permits local diversity. in case of doubt, the presumption must be in favor of the human right, because in the United States man is considered more important than the state» (See his Rights, Liberties, Freedoms: A Reappraisal, in the American Political Sciences Review, Vol. LVII. No. 4). For their part, Professors Myres S. McDougal and Gertrude C. K. Leighton seem even more categorical in asserting that «(our) participa :ion is well vvithin the scope of the treaty and other fede ral power». After elaborating this point at great length and convinkenc ilerine özel bir görev düştüğünü de belirtmiştir. Konuşmacı, yok sul ülkelerde yaşayan geniş insan yığınlarını hiç değilse en ilkel «insan haki arı»na kavuşturabilmek bakımından şimdiye kadar yapılmakta olan ekoromik yardımların yeterli olmadığını, bunun çoğu zaman yardımı yapan ülkenin kendi sanayici ve ihracatçılarına verile^ dolaylı bir süb-vansyon niteliği taşıdığını, bundan böyle milletlerarası alanda gerçek anlamıyla yeni bir «yardım» kavramının benimsenmesinin şart olduğu nu -ve bunun da tamamen karşılıksız bir yardım olması gerektiğini açık lamıştır. cingly refuting every argument put fonvard by those opposed to the idea of participation, Professors McDougal and Leighton conclude by stating that the negative case «misconceives the intimate interdependences, if not identity, of human rights and security, the worldwide interdependences of peoples elsevvhere; misconceives our obligations under the United Nations Charter...; misconceives both the scope of federal power under our Constitution över matters of international concern and the safeguard imposed by the Constitution on the exercise of such power; and, finally, misconceives the indispensability of human rights protection to a free society. Having quoted these authoritative opinions concerning the position of the United States, I should now like to look at this issue from a broader perspective, even at the risk of somevvhat extending the formal scope of the present debate. Vievved from an idealistic angle, concern över domestic jurisdictional niceties is indeed very much dwarfed by the magnitude of international and moral obligations which devolve on ali countries who profess attachment to democratic and liberal values. So far, as we ali know, although a great deal of lip service has been paid to the ideal of human rights, extremely little has been done to implement it. in this International Year of Human Rights, now drawing to its close, there is very little cause for self-congratulation when one considers that some of the basic rights set out in the Universal Declaration of 1948 are being repeatedly trampled upon or completely denied. An honest stock-taking of the situation at this juncture would certainly justify the deep disillusionment felt by responsible people throughout the world.
But now, when at long last the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, there is renewed hope of securing an international guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms. it is stipulated that these Covenants can come into force only after 35 State Members of the United Nations have ratified them.
Here, quite clearly, an inescapable choice awaits the United States. Can she really continue to sit back endlessly debating and wavering on the question of ratification, leaving the rest of the world puzzled över her lack of a positive stand? Or should she be among the first nations to ratify these treaties, thus encouraging other countries to follow süit and giving at the same time tangible proof of the sincerity of her claim to be a champion of democratic freedoms? Surely the second course is the obvious one, both from the point of view of moral considerations as well as from that of practical politics of self-interest regarding world image and prestige.
At this point, going beyond the question of ratification, I would like to submit the view that the United States should not content herself vdth mere adherence to the Human Rights Treatieswhich, af ter ali, does not require any great sacrifice -but should take an ective leading role in making the concept of human rights a concrete reality on a üniversel scale-Today we live in a world tragically divided into «haves» and «have-nots», one third of its populaticn enjoying a life of ease and comfort while the remaining two thirds exist under conditions of indescribable hardship and misery. For the great majority of these wretched masses the term «human rights» is meaningless, for they are deprived of even the most elementary rights of every human being. Indeed, their very existence is precarious, constantly threatened by hunger and disease. This is the shame and the tragedy of our century and it can no longer be ignored.
The International Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran earlier this year concentrated its attention on this problem, and, in calling for individual national effort to bridge the chasm between the rich and poor nations it exempted no nation from the obligation to contribute. The Proclamation of Teheran stated that contributions should be made according to each nation's capacity. Now, the United States may claim that, as the richest country in the world, she already bears the main burden of economic aid to the underdeveloped countries. But I think the time has come to adopt a new definition of «aid». Ali aid given to the poor nations should be, in order to merit the name, completely interest-free and untied-with no strings attached. in other words, it should be genuine, unselfish, altruistic aid and not, as has so often been the case, a disguised subsidy to domestic industrialists in the export business. The use of the word «altruistic» in this context may sound a bit naive, especially to those who believe in the truth of Bismarck's ::amous aphorism which asserts, quite bluntly, that «there is no altruism among nations». But this dictum should no longer be valid in our day. Men of goodvvill, the defenders of a new international morality, should see to it that it will no longer be valid.
I must ask your indulgence for this slight digression which may not appear to be directly relevant to the subject under discussion, but in my opinion ali questions concerning the implementation of human rights should be assessed in this broader perspective, lest they may not be fully understood and grasped in their proper dimensions.
I should like to conclude by saying that ratification of the U. N. sponsored Human Rights Treaties constitutes a moral as vvell as rational obligation for the United States and ali the other democratic countries of the free world. Failure to adhere to these Treaties by any government vvhich professes verbal attachment to liberal values would be automatically branded as nothing less than sheer hypocrisy by world public opinion, no matter how hard it might try to justify its attitude by invoking -real or imaginaryconstitutional obstacles.
And any government genuinely dedicated to the ideal of human rights and fundamental freedoms should not stop at mere formal ratification, but should make every possible effort to contribute to the realisation of this ideal on a universal level.
